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Can Russia Challenge NATO’s Dominance in the Baltic Sea Despite an Unfavorable Balance of Power.
While the Baltic Sea now appears as a strategic stronghold firmly held by NATO, Russian military capabilities in the region remain significant and could offer Moscow unexpected room for maneuver in the event of a crisis. In an article published by Challenges on April 25, 2025, Vincent Lamigeon relies on satellite images provided by Maxar and analyzed by Safran AI to present a detailed overview of Russian naval, aerial, and hybrid forces in the Baltic, with a particular focus on the Kaliningrad enclave.
The naval base at Baltiysk, home to the Baltic Fleet, hosts a diverse and significant naval force. (Picture source: @VincentLamigeon on X for Challenges /Maxar/Safran AI)
With Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023 and Sweden’s in 2024, the Baltic Sea has increasingly become a NATO-dominated maritime area. Access to this semi-enclosed sea passes through Denmark’s Øresund, Great Belt, and Little Belt straits, strategic chokepoints that Copenhagen and Stockholm could theoretically seal off in the event of conflict. Russia’s access to the Baltic is now limited to two vulnerable points: the military enclave of Kaliningrad and the city of Saint Petersburg. The Gulf of Finland, which leads to Saint Petersburg, could be blocked through mining operations or submarine interdiction conducted by Finland and Estonia. Despite this strategic isolation, Russia maintains considerable military capabilities in the region.
The naval base at Baltiysk, home to the Baltic Fleet, hosts a diverse and significant naval force. Satellite imagery analysis identifies around fifteen warships docked there. Among them is a Buyan-M class missile corvette, equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles with a range exceeding 1,500 kilometers, capable of striking deep strategic targets. A Kilo-class conventional attack submarine, specialized in coastal submarine warfare, is also present. The force includes two destroyers: a Sovremenny-class vessel for anti-ship warfare and a Udaloy-class vessel for anti-submarine warfare, each equipped with heavy missiles and advanced detection systems. Two multi-role Steregushchiy-class corvettes are moored alongside several Krivak-class frigates, intended to protect convoys and coastal installations. Additionally, three Dyugon-class landing ships, two Kashtan-class support vessels, and an Ivan Papanin-class icebreaking patrol vessel are based at the port.
The Baltiysk facilities are protected by reinforced defensive measures, including two camouflaged air defense systems, likely Pantsir-S1s, and a floating barrier designed to counter surface drones at the port entrance. These measures aim to prevent drone attacks, a threat demonstrated on April 7, 2024, when the missile corvette Serpukhov was severely damaged by a Ukrainian GUR operation.
Beyond the ships visible at the docks, other Russian naval units operate in the Baltic but are not visible on satellite images. These include Karakurt-class corvettes armed with Kalibr and Oniks missiles, as well as Ropucha-class landing ships. According to the Military Balance 2025 by the IISS, the Baltic Fleet comprises a total of 69 vessels. However, many of these are older, smaller patrol ships more suited to coastal operations than high-intensity conflict.
Russian aerial capabilities in the region remain active. In Kaliningrad, Chkalovsk Air Base hosts about twenty Su-27 multirole fighters, capable of performing air superiority and long-range interception missions. The base also occasionally hosts Il-78M tanker aircraft, which extend the operational range of Russian fighters and bombers. In 2022, Chkalovsk also temporarily hosted MiG-31K aircraft armed with hypersonic Kinjal missiles, capable of striking targets over 2,000 kilometers away. The Chernyakhovsk Air Base, less active, nonetheless hosts several S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile batteries, providing dense aerial coverage for the enclave.
A Kilo-class conventional attack submarine, specialized in coastal submarine warfare at Baltiysk (Picture source: Wikimedia Commons)
Beyond Kaliningrad, Russia relies on its northern installations on the Kola Peninsula to maintain strategic reach over the Baltic. Radar imagery of Olenya Air Base reveals a notable concentration of Tu-95 strategic bombers. These aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional cruise missiles, regularly conduct demonstration flights over the Baltic. Having been relocated from Engels Air Base following repeated Ukrainian attacks, their deployment reflects Moscow’s operational adaptation. Nearby, at Olenya Guba naval base, the intelligence-gathering ship Yantar is stationed, suspected of conducting underwater espionage operations targeting Western communication infrastructures.
In light of these capabilities, Baltic coastal states are concerned that Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare efforts—GPS jamming, undersea infrastructure sabotage, and radar targeting of NATO aircraft—could escalate into open conflict. The overall balance of power remains unfavorable to Russia, which fields only one or two submarines in the Baltic compared to about ten NATO submarines, and a few dozen fighter aircraft against nearly 400 operated by NATO members. However, according to Danish military intelligence, if hostilities in Ukraine were to cease, Russia could refocus its military assets westward within just six months, posing a potential threat to a Baltic state or seeking to alter the regional balance by force.
Several possible scenarios are under consideration. One involves seizing the Suwalki Corridor, a strategic strip connecting Kaliningrad to Belarus and cutting off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO. Another scenario envisions Russia launching a naval operation to seize three strategic islands: Gotland (Sweden), Bornholm (Denmark), and the Åland archipelago (Finland). Control of these islands would enable the deployment of anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, establishing a denial zone that would impede NATO reinforcements.
Aware of these threats, regional states have taken action. Sweden re-militarized Gotland in 2017; Bornholm has hosted numerous NATO exercises, and in 2024, the US Navy deployed a Typhon missile system there, capable of striking Kaliningrad from 1,500 kilometers away. The Åland archipelago, however, remains demilitarized, representing a vulnerability in NATO’s defensive posture.
Despite its structural weaknesses, Russia retains a significant destabilization capacity in the Baltic Sea. Its naval, aerial, and hybrid means enable it to contemplate rapid and targeted actions that could catch NATO forces off guard should tensions in Eastern Europe suddenly escalate. Vigilance among coastal states and the strengthening of NATO’s presence in the region thus remain essential to prevent any strategic surprise.